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ABSTRACT 
International legalization promises to civilize world politics with global legal norms that 
bind states’ behavior effectively. However, international legal norm can also institution-
alize unjust forms of cooperation and the dominance of powerful states. In order to chal-
lenge unjust global rules the concept of civil disobedience has to be extended to interna-
tional law violations by sovereign states. In the national realm civil disobedience has 
contributed extensively to the establishment of human rights. In order to use the concept 
for international politics, this paper develops criteria for state civil disobedience which 
are then applied to the Argentine foreign debt repudiation and Bolivia’s violations of 
international investment law. Furthermore two hypotheses concerning causes and con-
sequences of state civil disobedience are formulated. 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 86) 
 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1 
1. INTERNATIONAL LEGALIZATION BETWEEN ANARCHY AND TYRANNY ...............................2 
2. FROM INDIVIDUAL TO STATE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ...........................................................4 
2.1. Illegality ....................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2. Conscientiousness ........................................................................................................ 8 
2.3. Aiming at change in laws or policies ........................................................................... 9 
2.4. Non-Violence ............................................................................................................. 10 
2.5. Publicity ..................................................................................................................... 10 
3. EMPIRICAL CASES ..........................................................................................................11 
3.1. Argentina’s debt repudiation...................................................................................... 11 
3.2. Bolivia’s violations of bilateral investment treaties................................................... 16 
4. CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF STATE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ....................................................22 
5. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................24 
REFERENCE........................................................................................................................25 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ........................................................................................................27 
 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 86) 
- 1 - 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2002 Argentina was hit by a severe financial and economic crisis and defaulted on its 
public debt of 141$US billion. Argentina’s excessive foreign debt burden originated 
from the military regime (1976-83) and since then increased steadily although Argenti-
na implemented IMF structural adjustment programs. After massive hunger revolts had 
thrown the old government out of office, Argentina repudiated its international debt 
service openly. Arguing that basic social rights are prior-ranking to debt service, Argen-
tina in 2003 realized a 70% debt cut. This largest ever sovereign debt cut violated inter-
national credit law clearly, as many court rulings confirmed later.  
Bolivia violated international investment rules in several instances. In accordance 
with many NGOs, Bolivia argues that bilateral investment treaties and the World 
Bank’s investor-to-state dispute settlement procedure ICSID1 protect corporate profit 
making at the expense of social and ecological regulation. Due to massive demonstrati-
ons Bolivia in 2000 withdrew a private water service license, because the investor had 
raised water rates strongly in the city of Cochabamba. In 2005 Bolivia also ended the 
license of another transnational company in La Paz/El Alto for the same reasons. Both 
measures were challenged under different bilateral investment treaties, while Bolivia 
argued that the right to access to water is prior-ranking to investor rights.   
These are two examples of weak countries openly violating international law, argu-
ing that it is unjust and should be reformed to better reflect moral demands. The same 
happened in numerous other cases of states breaking international law on the grounds of 
fundamental rights arguments, as e.g. South Africa’s and Brazil’s production of generic 
medicines that violated TRIPS intellectual property law. Further examples include po-
werful OECD member states as well. Member states of the European Community rejec-
ted the import of hormone treated beef from the United States in order to protect their 
citizens’ health, violating a WTO ruling. And the same will probably happen in the cur-
rently pending conflict between the EC and the United States concerning import of ge-
netically modified plants.  
This paper argues that these cases can best be understood in analogy to individual ci-
vil disobedience in national law systems. Civil disobedience theory has to be extended 
to the international realm in order to overcome the gap between international law and 
international justice. As in national societies, where civil disobedience contributed 
significantly to end colonialism (Mahatma Gandhi) or black people’s discrimination 
(Martin Luther King), state civil disobedience can become a major tool to challenge 
unjust international rules.  
                                                 
1  International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
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In order to develop the concept of state civil disobedience, this paper’s first chapter 
discusses the process of international legalization from a moral perspective. While the 
case for state civil disobedience is not bound to a particular historical period, the present 
extension of international law makes state civil disobedience more likely than ever. The 
second chapter presents national civil disobedience theory and derives criteria from this 
for the application on international law-breaking. Chapter three describes Argentina’s 
debt repudiation (3.1) and Bolivia’s violation of investment treaties (3.2.) as cases of 
state civil disobedience. Chapter four develops some preliminary conjectures on causes 
and effects of state civil disobedience. The questions here are: 1) under what cir-
cumstances do states apply civil disobedience, rather than abiding unjust international 
law or opting for legal reform paths, 2) can state civil disobedience bring about moral 
progress in international law?  
1. INTERNATIONAL LEGALIZATION BETWEEN ANARCHY AND TYRANNY 
The concept of state civil disobedience is today more than ever needed to limit interna-
tional legalization processes in the sense that international law is bound to universal 
human rights. In the last decades researchers witnessed an impressive extension of in-
ternational primary norms shaping states’ behaviour and secondary norms guiding norm 
interpretation and enforcement. The number of international organizations and multila-
teral or bilateral treaties between states increased enormously, shaping states’ behaviour 
in almost all issue areas with a more and more dense web of rules (Abbott/Snidal 2000; 
Romano 1999; Zangl 2006). The behaviour of modern states is today embedded in ex-
tensive rules covering such different issues as security, trade, investment, environmental 
protection, human rights, labour conditions etc. And even more significant, a growing 
number of international courts and quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedures adjudi-
cate conflicts between states or states and private parties. Some of these instances like 
the WTO dispute settlement procedure can authorize economic sanctions to bring states 
into compliance with their rulings. Others, like the European Court on Human Rights, 
have the mandate to issue legally binding rulings, which are implemented by member 
states in a vast majority of cases. International law is today stronger than ever before in 
history, so that the traditional state sovereignty is deeply transformed. In the Westphali-
an world order – although this order was constituted by international law – state sove-
reignty was characterized by structural anarchy between sovereign states that were free 
to choose their internal order and external policy. This meant that neither genocide nor 
war of aggression was forbidden. By contrast, at the beginning of the 21st century, state 
sovereignty is embedded in international law provisions that regulate state’s internal 
order as well as their external policies significantly. 
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The process of international legalization constitutes not only a deep transformation of 
state sovereignty. The transformation of the anarchical state system towards global rule 
of law is without doubt as well a major moral progress. My concept of moral progress is 
derived from cosmopolitan theory of international justice which argues that universal 
human rights constitute the basis for legitimacy of state sovereignty and the global legal 
system (Buchanan 2004: 1-13, Höffe 1999: 62-63, 308-310, Pogge 1989: 238-239). In 
that view, every change in the international legal system, that improves the realization 
of (political as well as social) human rights, is considered a moral progress.  
Three aspects may demonstrate that an anarchical state system is morally unaccep-
table. Firstly, in an anarchical state system, powerful states can dominate and exploit 
weaker states as they wish. Aggressive wars as well as colonial exploitation demonstra-
te that without rules, inter-state relations are dominated by force and injustice. Second-
ly, in an anarchical state system individuals have no international protection against 
totalitarian governments, so that genocide, internal war crimes and other human rights 
abuses can not be prevented. And thirdly, external damages of state action on foreign 
citizens are not limited. As an example emissions of carbon dioxide emanating mainly 
from industrial countries cause the climate change which damages especially poor co-
astal and island states. Protectionist economic measures can as well cause external da-
mages, like the US cotton export subventions that destroy local markets in many Afri-
can countries. Binding international rules are indispensable, to contain unequal power 
relations between states, protect individuals from abusive state violence and limit exter-
nal damages from state action on others. In other words, there will be no international 
justice without international rule of law.  
But, however, the transformation from anarchy towards rule of law does not tell the 
whole story about international legalization. Legalization optimists tend to oversee that 
international law does not by itself realize the above-mentioned objectives, but can as 
well incorporate injustice. The opposite of anarchy – the absence of all rules – is tyran-
ny, a system of effective but extremely unjust rules. We have to acknowledge that parts 
of the evolving international legal system are conceived in wide parts of the world as 
tyrannical or at least extremely unjust (Ali et al. 2005; Pogge 2005: 15-20; Ziegler 
2005). This holds true primarily for international economic law, which institutionalizes 
the dominance of northern countries and corporations at the expense of southern socie-
ties. An example of international law conceived as tyranny is the WTO’s 1994 TRIPS 
agreement on intellectual property, which restricted production and forbid import of 
generic medicines. Developing countries, whose public health programs before TRIPS 
relied largely on cheap generic medicines, faced sharp price increases for essential me-
dicines. AIDS activists, international NGOs and even the United Nations Development 
Program declared, that TRIPS protects pharmaceutical corporations’ profits by tolera-
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ting the avoidable death of thousands of poor ill people (UNDP 1999: 66-76). The IMF 
is another institution perceived as global tyrant. The IMF’s activity in Argentina in the 
1980th and 1990th was described as “substantive violations of economic, social and cul-
tural human rights by structural adjustment programs” (Morgan-Foster 2003: 577). 
They point to the fact, that the IMF had met Argentina under pressure to accept all pub-
lic debt resulting from the military period, although this debt was largely raised under 
corrupt and cleptocratic conditions.2 And later IMF structural adjustment programs wor-
sened the debt crises and placed foreign debt service above basic social rights of the 
Argentine population. 
International legalization does not by itself promote moral progress. As the TRIPS 
and IMF examples indicate, international law can also institute unjust rules that violate 
basic rights of persons in (often poor) countries. From a moral point of view, it has to be 
assured that the promise of international legalization – to overcome the anarchical state 
system – does not lead to an international law system that enforces unjust rules that in-
stitutionalize the dominance of some states at the expense of others. In cases where un-
just rules are already incorporated in international law, state civil disobedience can 
serve as a remedy. 
2. FROM INDIVIDUAL TO STATE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
In national law systems, civil disobedience committed by individuals, had paramount 
importance for the realization of fundamental human rights. It has to be reminded that 
our national law systems originally did not recognize any human rights norms, but pro-
tected, above others, feudal, bourgeois, male or white people’s privileges. It was only 
by struggles of social movements as the enlightenment, labour movement, women’s 
movement and the civil rights movement that human rights became incorporated into 
national law systems. In all these struggles civil disobedience was used – besides legal 
reform and violent resistance – as a major instrument to challenge unjust law and to 
replace it by more equitable norms. As an example, workers established illegal trade 
unions and used forbidden strike action to protest against exploitative labour conditions. 
Coloured people in the United States went into restaurants and busses, which were re-
served by law for whites, to protest against their legal discrimination. And Greenpeace 
activists climbed illegally on industrial chimneys to protest for the enactment of envi-
                                                 
2  In 2000 Argentina’s High Court declared in a ruling, that large parts of the public debt raised under the 
military regime is unconstitutional. The court counted 477 single criminal acts in connection with public 
debt raised from 1976-83 and it stated a partial responsibility of the IMF and other multilateral lender, who 
had knowledge about the criminal character of the debt (OLMOS, Alejandro s/ Denuncia, Nr. 14467). 
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ronmental law. Almost all social movements fighting against injustice used civil dis-
obedience to challenge contested laws.  
Political theory of the democratic nation state acknowledges civil disobedience as an 
illegal but legitimate way to defend basic rights and to overcome the tension between 
law and justice (Arendt 1972; Habermas 1983; Bedau 1961, 1991; Dworkin 1977: 206-
222; Rawls 1979: 399-430). Civil disobedience can be described as a measure of last 
resort to challenge the violation of basic rights. Defenders of civil disobedience argue 
that it is better to violate rules of minor importance (as the defence to climb on foreign 
property) than to accept major injustice (as environmental pollution). While legal re-
form is normally preferable to illegal reform, civil disobedience proposes alternative 
options when legal reform channels are blocked. However, civil disobedience avoids the 
legitimacy problems of violent resistance, which violates basic rights to defend other 
basic rights. While civil disobedience generally violates only rules of minor importance, 
violent resistance poses a threat to one of the most fundamental norms of modern law, 
the sanctity of human life. 
Civil disobedience has a position at the margins of rule-following behaviour. Citi-
zens committing civil disobedience support the idea of rule of law and they thrive to 
make the law more just by breaking it. Law violations are justified by higher-ranking 
moral and/or legal norms (e.g. human dignity, human rights, constitutional principles) 
that are allegedly violated by specific legal norms or policies. This feature constitutes 
the main difference between mere law breaking and civil disobedience. Mere law break-
ing, e.g. by criminals, has selfish, particular objectives and it constitutes a threat to the 
rule of law. If a huge number of citizens would break the law in all cases, when they 
could have personal advantages from that, society would quickly degenerate towards 
anarchy. By contrast, civil disobedient law breaking has universal moral objectives and 
it stabilizes the rule of law as it applies the highest moral and legal principles of a soci-
ety and thereby brings morality and law in accordance. A huge number of citizens that 
violates unjust law in order to replace it by more just law, does in no way pose a threat 
to the rule of law. The do rather strengthen the rule of law, since the new law will be 
based on a greater social acceptance and thereby ameliorate citizens commitment to the 
law system in general. 
However, although civil disobedience is widely accepted in national law systems, the 
concept is normally not applied to international relations. While at the national level we 
can distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate law-breaking by individual citizens, 
there is no normative theory that legitimizes states to violate unjust international law. 
There are some exceptions, but they are either limited to military interventions or not 
very elaborated.  
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Concerning military interventions Buchanan (2001,  2004) used the term illegal acts 
of legal reform to describe incidents like the NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999 or 
British navy’s illegal seizure of foreign vessels to end the 19th century’s transatlantic 
slave trade. Buchanan is right to reject the term civil disobedience for these cases, be-
cause they concern hegemonic powers, that don’t have to frighten any sanctions for 
their illegal acts.3 Compared to individual civil disobedience in a state with a function-
ing monopoly of force, international law violations by hegemonic powers pose a far 
greater threat to the rule of law. This holds true especially in the security field, in which 
international law is particularly weak and can easily be damaged by great powers. Bu-
chanan’s examples are rather comparable to morally justified violations of domestic law 
by e.g. a president who enjoys immunity. It might be legitimate for immune presidents 
to violate domestic law, e.g. in a state of emergency, but this is clearly different from 
ordinary citizens civil disobedience. However, states that violate international law are 
not always hegemons or except from legal sanctions. And there are also areas of inter-
national law, like international economic law, that are not as weak as security law. A 
constellation of strong international law and weak norm violating states would be much 
closer to civil disobedience, but Buchanan’s approach doesn’t consider such cases.    
Besides military cases, some authors explicitly use the term civil disobedience for 
law violations by states, but generally only in short terms. Nancy Kokaz used the term 
international civil disobedience to describe Brazil’s and India’s policies concerning the 
production of generic medicines and the TRIPS agreement on intellectual property (Ko-
kaz 2005: 72). Political philosopher Otfried Höffe proposed the concept of world fed-
eral disobedience (weltföderaler Ungehorsam), which he defines as “disobedience of 
one state or a group of states against the world republic” (Höffe 1999: 342, translation 
by author). His approach is based on the argument that states are bearers of certain state 
rights, or “human rights of states”, which protect the citizenry as a collective (Höffe 
1999: 324). Since the state has the task to protect human rights, it must also have certain 
state rights that enable him to fulfil his task. Höffe thereby demonstrates that the con-
cept of civil disobedience can be transferred to the international level and that it is nec-
essary for a normative theory of international order. But his approach concerns only the 
imagined ideal of a federal world republic and it doesn’t develop specific criteria to 
identify cases. Due to this it has only limited value for today’s real world conflicts. 
More specific is Goodin’s approach (2005). Concerning international customary law, 
Goodin argues that this class of law can only be reformed by illegal norm-violation, 
                                                 
3  The violent character of military interventions is another argument against the use of the term civil disobe-
dience. Since civil disobedience necessarily demands non-violent means of action, military action should be 
excluded. 
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except minor interpretational shifts. As there is no international procedure to change 
customary law by collective decision, reform-willing states can only breach customary 
law. Gooding therefore proposes to use criteria derived from national civil disobedience 
to distinguish mere law breakers from “would-be-law-makers”. The essence of his ap-
proach is a generalizability-test that assesses if a law-violating state accepts that the 
rules it proposes are applied to other states as well. A mere law breaker fails the gener-
alizability-test, since he wants to be exempt from law provisions, while would-be-law-
makers concede that others may as well benefit from new rules. 
This literature report demonstrates that there is already some agreement, that law-
violations by states can under certain conditions be comparable to civil disobedience. 
However, further definitional and conceptual work is necessary to apply the concept to 
specific empirical cases. Civil disobedience is generally defined as a “public, non-
violent and conscientious breach of law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a 
change in laws or government policies” (Brownlee 2007, alike: Rawls 1979: 401, Bedau 
1961). In the following I will apply these classical criteria of individual civil disobedi-
ence to state civil disobedience. There are other, more permissive definitions that are 
less strict concerning violence, publicity and reformism, in order to address situations in 
more authoritarian states (Raz 1979, Greenawalt 1987). However, since the global legal 
system is more fragile than national legal systems, it seemed appropriate to me, to apply 
a rather strict approach. Since state violations of international law pose a bigger threat to 
the whole legal system than individual law violations, a rather strict approach is needed 
to prevent damaging the global legal system.     
2.1. Illegality 
To describe a specific action as civil disobedience, it has firstly to be determined that 
the action is a breach of law. Contrary to international politics, it is rather easy to detect 
a breach of law on the national level. Here, civil disobedience such as climbing on a 
chimney normally triggers police arrest and criminal conviction and this demonstrates 
the illegality of the action. However, the picture is complicated since police and courts 
sometimes disagree on what is a breach of law. A drastic example is the destruction of a 
British hawk jet due to be exported to Indonesia by four women in 1996.4 The activists, 
who caused a damage of 1.5 million pounds with household hammers, were arrested by 
the police as they obviously destroyed foreign property. At court they argued that their 
action was essentially legal, since they prevented the airplanes from being used for 
atrocities in Indonesian-occupied East-Timor. A Liverpool court in 1997 acquitted the 
women, using a law which states that “a person may use reasonable force in the preven-
                                                 
4  East Timor protesters win peace prize, Agence France-Press, 23.4.1997 
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tion of crime”. As this case demonstrates, civil disobedience actions can turn out to be 
legal, at least in retrospective. In fact, it is even one of the main objectives of civil dis-
obedience, that the law (or its application) will be changed in a way that the action is 
considered legal in the end. In court, many civil disobedience activists apply legal ar-
guments such as the supremacy of human rights or the above-mentioned provision in 
English criminal law, to build a bridge for judges to acknowledge their moral motiva-
tions. However, we would still call such actions like the hawk jet destruction civil dis-
obedience, since the women were arrested and brought to court after destroying the air 
planes. To meet the illegality criterion it therefore suffices that an action is declared to 
be supposedly illegal by executive officials (like the police or public prosecutors) at the 
time of committing, even if it turns out to be legal in the end.  
On the international level it is much more difficult to detect the supposed illegality of 
specific state action, since the law is often rather unclear. One possibility to detect ille-
gal state action would be to consider only cases in which a breach of international law 
has been determined by an international tribunal. But this would exclude supposedly 
illegal state actions that later turn out to be legal or undecided, because complainants 
withdraw their case. Furthermore, in many issue areas there are no international tribu-
nals or existing courts are appealed only rarely. To detect supposedly illegal state act it 
would be best to have recourse to a world prosecutor or world police that persecute law 
violating states.  But international law hasn’t got any executive officials who regularly 
decide on the supposed legality or illegality of state actions. Due to the absence of a 
world executive, the only way to detect a supposed violation of international law is to 
determine, if the concerned state at the time of committing a certain action faced a seri-
ous probability to be subject of legal consequences. If a state risks legal sanctions, we 
may say that it commits a supposedly illegal action, even if there is no conviction by an 
international tribunal in the end.      
2.2. Conscientiousness 
Secondly, to be qualified as civil disobedience, supposed breaches of law have to be 
committed conscientiously. Civil disobedient activists have to demonstrate that they 
don’t breach the law merely for selfish, personal reasons but because they want to pre-
vent serious, moral injustice. Concerning state civil disobedience, the same criteria can 
be applied: the responsible state representatives that commit an international breach of 
law have to justify their action with universal moral arguments instead of presenting 
particular, national reasons.   
Two clarifications are needed to impede misunderstandings of this point. The con-
cept of conscience is often understood as a completely unselfish internal motivation that 
leads the action. This understanding feeds doubts as to whether state representatives can 
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ever exhibit such an unselfish internal moral motivation, since states as well as politi-
cians pursue strategic objectives. From my point of view, complete unselfishness as 
well as internal motivation are misleading criteria, that fit neither to individual, nor to 
state civil disobedience. To consider the conscientiousness of civil disobedience it 
should rather be investigated, if universal moral arguments are presented to justify the 
action. 
Firstly, the conscience criterion does not exclude that a civil disobedient activist may 
as well have – besides his moral arguments – personal advantages from reformed poli-
cies. A Greenpeace activist that climbs illegally on a chimney to prevent environmental 
pollution may serve as an example. His moral argument is that environmental pollution 
damages citizen’s health and has therefore to be stopped. Besides this, the activist might 
be share-holder of a company that sells filter technology and would therefore have a 
financial advantage of stricter environmental legislation. But this advantage does not 
reduce the value of his universal arguments concerning citizen’s health.  
A second, interrelated clarification concerns the question, if a moral motivation or a 
moral justification is needed. A moral motivation requires that an activist is internally 
motivated by his cause, whereas the moral justification requires only that he uses moral 
arguments in his public statements. I argue that the motivational aspects should be ne-
glected and that only public justification has to be considered. It is simply not relevant 
to know if the Greenpeace climbs on the chimney because he likes adventures or be-
cause he really wants to save his fellow citizen’s health. The only decisive aspect is, that 
the reasons he presents to justify his action are not personal but of a universal, moral 
character. Furthermore, we simply have no possibility to check internal motivations of 
actors, because we never know if they lie, when they talk about their motivations. In 
public discourse as well as in empirical research we can therefore only meaningfully 
talk about public justifications.    
2.3. Aiming at change in laws or policies 
This third criterion is essential for civil disobedience, because it demonstrates the activ-
ist’s commitment to the rule of law in general. The objective to provoke a change in 
laws or policies underlines that civil disobedient activists don’t seek primarily personal 
advantages, but that they want to have new rules that are applied to all. As an example 
the activists that occupied reserved-for-whites buss seats during the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott, didn’t only want to be exempt personally from racial segregation. Instead they 
fought for a solution for all black people, the abolishment of racial segregation by law. 
This political character of law violations marks the difference between personal disobe-
dience and civil disobedience. 
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The same applies to state civil disobedience. Only law violating states that strive for 
a general change of international law and policies that affects other states as well can be 
qualified as civil disobedient states. This change can have a variety of forms, at least the 
four following: Firstly, a disobedient state can try to convince contracting parties of an 
international treaty to alter the treaty itself or its application by formulating additional 
interpretative rules. Secondly, a state can try to establish new customary law by break-
ing old customary law and convincing other states and lawyer of his proposed new 
norms. Thirdly, a state can try to convince international courts or comparable dispute 
settlement bodies to establish new case law, that differs from the hitherto law interpreta-
tion. And fourthly, states could leave criticized international institutions and/or create 
new ones that better reflect their moral claims.  
2.4. Non-Violence 
Out of all illegal acts, only those can be considered as civil disobedience, which are 
committed in a non-violent manner. Non-violence is indispensable for the civility of any 
law violation.   
However, transferring the non-violence criterion to state civil disobedience confronts 
us with the problem, that all state action is characterized by the monopoly of force, 
which is a defining element of statehood. In the end, the enforcement of all general laws 
in a state depends on latent or actual police violence. One could argue that the fact that 
states regularly use force impedes them from being able to commit civil disobedience. 
My argument is that the monopoly of force is generally accepted to be legitimately in 
the hands of the state. It is, even more, one of the main prerequisites for peaceful coex-
istence and the realization of human rights. For sure, the monopoly of force has to be 
constrained by the rule of law, so that force is only used on the basis of general laws. 
But if this condition is fulfilled, there is no doubt, that the use of force by the state has a 
civilian character. The non-violence criterion has therefore to be reformulated as a le-
gitimate force criterion. International law violations by states can only be called civil 
disobedience when the state doesn’t use any extra-legal violence.5 
2.5. Publicity 
The fifth civil disobedience criterion requires that law violations have to be committed 
in public. Activists may not hide themselves from the police or the media and they have 
to present their arguments to the wider public. The publicity criterion is essential for the 
civil character of any law violation. Who breaches the law publicly, acknowledges the 
                                                 
5  This argumentation concerns only the internal use of (police) violence, while the external use of (military) vio-
lence is left out.  
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necessity to justify his act before the public. This means that one tries to convince the 
society with arguments, instead of blackmailing it with violence or free-riding in se-
crecy. And who is willing to be arrested and put to court for his matter, thereby demon-
strates his acceptance of the rule of law in general.   
This criterion can be applied directly to international affairs. All kinds of secret state 
acts, that violate international law, can surely not be qualified as civil disobedience. 
However, most relevant cases can not be hidden from the public due to their essentially 
public character. The enactment of laws that violate an international treaty or executive 
orders concerning e.g. debt repudiation cannot be hidden from the public. The publicity 
criterion is therefore only of minor importance for the assessment of international law 
violations.  
3. EMPIRICAL CASES 
In the following I describe two empirical cases of developing countries that violated 
international economic law in order to protect their citizen’s basic human rights. In both 
issue areas – international credit law and international investment law – there are a 
number of other states that considered or actually committed comparable law violations. 
However, the selected cases are outstanding examples since Argentina and Bolivia are 
both positioned at the cutting edge in the global struggle for a more just economic order. 
3.1. Argentina’s debt repudiation 
Argentina’s debt crisis had it’s origins in the military rule from 1976-82. During this 
time Argentina’s foreign public debt raised from 7.9 billion to 35.7 billion $US. As an 
Argentine high court ruling later confirmed, large parts of this debt had a criminal char-
acter, because it served the enrichment of corrupt elites that indebted public enterprises 
to finance massive capital-exports into private hands (Olmos 2006). This demonstrates a 
first justice deficit in international credit law: There is almost no legal provision to de-
clare sovereign debt invalid, even if the debt was clearly raised for criminal purposes. 
The Argentine military regime’s debt, South Africa’s apartheid debt, Iraq’s debt under 
Saddam Hussein – there are many examples of criminal sovereign debt, that countries 
may not refuse to pay back. Only in cases of state succession are states allowed to reject 
former sovereign debt according to the odious debt doctrine (Khalfan et al. 2003; Olmos 
Gaona 2005).6 This doctrine stipulates that states may refuse the payment of former 
                                                 
6  The main historic example concerning odious debt is the refusal by the United States to pay Cuban foreign 
debt, after the had won the island in a war with Spain in 1898. The american argument, which was later re-
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sovereign debt, when this debt has been raised against the interests and without ap-
proval of the population and creditors were aware of these circumstances. However, 
although many NGOs and lawyers claim that this doctrine should also apply to regime 
changes like the transformation from military to civil government in Argentina, debt 
repudiation is still illegal in this case.  
The first democratic government after military dictatorship under President Raúl Al-
fonsín (1983-89) pledged to scrutinize the legitimacy of all debt contracts raised by the 
military regime. This means, that Alfonsín considered illegal debt repudiation as a pol-
icy option. However, the IMF – which had collaborated with the military regime be-
cause this approved its neoliberal policy recommendations – pressured Argentina to 
acknowledge all former debt contracts. The IMF threatened to cut Argentina from lend-
ing, if the country would not pay investors out. Eventually Alfonsín bowed to the pres-
sure and acknowledged the debt (Interview Olmos).  
A second chance to repudiate the military regime’s debt came in 2000, when a 
lengthy criminal process against the military regime’s minister of economy was won by 
journalist Alejandro Olmos. The Argentine High Court had found at least 477 criminal 
offences related to sovereign debt contracts of the period 1976-82.7 The court ruling 
declared as well a partial guilt on part of the IMF, other multilateral lenders and banks, 
because they had cooperated with the military regime, although they were aware of 
these criminal activities. The court recommended the Argentine Congress to consider 
the case. However, since there had been several bond exchanges since the military re-
gime, so that most Argentine state bonds from that time had changed form and owner, it 
would have been difficult to repudiate this debt. Although some deputies pleaded for an 
investigation, the Argentine Congress ignored the court ruling (Cafiero 2004, Interview 
Cafiero). 
In December 2001 Argentina experienced a dramatic economic crisis which trig-
gered mass protests, rising unemployment and the collapse of the peso. Poverty in Ar-
gentina rose drastically during the crisis and parts of the population even suffered hun-
ger.  During the 1990s Argentina had been a loudly praised example of free market re-
forms according to IMF policy recommendations. The economic crisis marked the be-
ginning of Argentina’s move away from neoliberal economic policy and the refusal to 
pay its sovereign debt instead of financing social programs.  
Argentina’s situation in December 2001 points to a further injustice in international: 
the absence of a fair and transparent state insolvency procedure or comparable rules that 
                                                                                                                                               
flected in the formulation of the odious debt doctrine was that the Cuban debt was raised in order to sup-
press the population and without their approval.  
7  OLMOS, Alejandro s/ Denuncia, Nr. 14467 
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allow developing states to reduce unsustainable debt amounts. State are not only forbid-
den to refuse odious debt – as was shown above – they also have to pay their debt even 
at the cost of hunger and poverty in their country (Barry/Tomitova 2006). Due to these 
rules states are legally bound to debt service even if this implies the violation of basic 
human rights as the right to food of their population. Sure, sometimes creditor countries 
decide to abate developing countries’ debt – but these debt cuts depend on creditor’s 
good-will, while debtors have no legal means to refuse debt payments. Argentina’s de-
cision to repudiate large parts of its sovereign debt therefore constituted a violation of 
international credit law. 
During the midst of economic turmoil and violent protests, transitional president 
Rodríguez Saá declared on 24th of December 2001 a unilateral moratorium on the re-
payment of large parts of its public debt which amounted to 144 billion US-dollars 
(Damill et al. 2005). This decision was directly caused by the massive demonstrations in 
whole Argentina, where the population demanded tough measures against the economic 
crisis. To be precise, Argentina refused the repayment of its public debt held by argen-
tine and foreign private creditors, while it continued repayment of multilateral creditors 
(IMF, World Bank…). The moratorium was justified as a measure of emergency, since 
the very functioning of the argentine society was at stake during the economic crisis.  
The moratorium from December 2001 only meant that Argentina postponed its debt 
service while it still acknowledged the debt in general. Since this could not lead a way 
out of the crisis, the government under President Néstor Kirchner turned in 2003 to 
open debt repudiation (Christian Aid 2007: 24-26). Kirchner had pledged at his inaugu-
ral speech in May 2003 that Argentina would not “return to paying debt at the cost of 
hunger and exclusion of Argentines”.8 This statement was supported by many interna-
tional NGOs as the Jubilee Network and local protests against the IMF (which wanted 
to compel Argentina at that time to high budged surpluses so that it could fulfil its debt 
service). Argentina’s economy was recovering meanwhile, due to the devaluation of the 
peso and the debt moratorium. In order to assure this recovery Kirchner presented in 
January 2005 a proposal to cut private creditors bonds by 70%. The proposal invited 
creditors to exchange their old bonds until the 25th of February 2005 with new, dis-
counted bonds.9 The proposal concerned bonds worth 103 billion US-dollars, which 
were held by about 500.000 private and institutional investors in a diversity of coun-
tries. While creditors were outraged by this biggest sovereign debt cut in history, the 
Argentine Congress passed in February 2005 a law that forbid renegotiation of the pro-
posal. Furthermore, the law stipulated that Argentina would refuse all payments to 
                                                 
8  President Néstor Kircher, Inaugural address, Argentina, 25 May 2003. 
9  Argentina Starting Drive To Emerge From Default, New York Times, 12.1.2005 
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creditors that didn’t accept the bond exchange.10 In the end, 76% of all creditors ac-
cepted the bond exchange, so that the debt cut was largely successful. One of the chief-
negotiators concluded even that international sovereign debt regime would be trans-
formed by this event: “This is a watershed event, with great impact on the international 
financial system. The Argentine restructuring shows that in case of default, sovereigns 
have much more power than before, maybe even the upper hand. The rules of the game 
have changed.“11  
However, although the majority had accepted the bond exchange, a number of for-
eign creditors filed complaints against Argentina in national courts of the United States, 
Germany, Italy and other countries. Many of these complaints, which were in parts al-
ready lanced during the moratorium, were successful and demonstrated that the Argen-
tine debt moratorium violated international law. As an example, the German Constitu-
tional Court decided in July 2007 that there is no provision in international law that 
would allow Argentina to refuse debt payments.12 Argentina had pledged to have been 
in a situation of state emergency, what the court refused.13 Argentina is therefore 
obliged to pay the full amount to German holders of old Argentine state bonds. How-
ever, although many creditors won their cases in court, they have problems to enforce 
their rights. Some creditors tried unsuccessfully to confiscate Argentina’s embassies and 
presidential jet, but these belongings are protected by diplomatic immunity. But at least 
in one case a court in Maryland, USA decided to freeze belongings of the Argentine 
Military in the United States.14 However, although this flood of legal proceedings in 
different countries clearly demonstrated the illegality of Argentina’s debt cut, also the 
new Government under President Christina Fernandez Kirchner continues the refusal to 
pay out the remaining creditors. 
                                                 
10  Argentina pushes law to boost debt swap approval, Reuters News, 3.2.2005; ‚No new offer’ on Argentina’s 
defaulted debt proposal, Financial Times, 7.2.2005 
11  Argentina Announces Deal on Its Debt Default, New York Times, 4.3.2005 
12  Bundesverfassungsgericht - Pressestelle -, Pressemitteilung Nr. 75/2007 vom 5.Juli 2007, Zum Beschluss 
vom 8. Mai 2007 – 2 BvM 1-5/03; 2 BvM 1/06; 2 BvM2/06 
13  There is currently some confusion in international economic law with regard to the applicability of the 
concept of state emergency (Schill 2007). While the German Constitional Court as well as several ICSID 
Panel have refused the validity of state emergency as a justification for Argentine economic policies, a new 
ICSID decision (LG&E v. Argentine Republic) has justified certain economic policies due to state emer-
gency. However, LG&E v. Argentine Republic has no direct relevance for the sovereign debt issue.     
14  US Judge Freezes $3M Argentina Military Assets – Reports, Dow Jones International News, 6.2.2004; 
Argentina govt says won’t alter debt restructuring offer despite asset seizure, AFX International Focus, 
6.2.2004 
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Argentina’s debt refusal was justified with the obligation of the state towards its citi-
zens. But besides this, Argentina also pleaded for reforms of the international financial 
system. As an example, President Kirchner demanded in September 2003 at the United 
National General Assembly that the IMF be reformed in way that it serves the fight 
against poverty.15 This reform proposal targeted IMF structural adjustment programs 
and policy recommendations that place debt service above citizen’s social rights. How-
ever, the Argentine reform proposals were rather vague and they didn’t reflect civil so-
ciety demands for a neutral state insolvency procedure and the application of the odious 
debt doctrine. Although they approved Argentina’s debt repudiation NGOs in Argentina 
and abroad were rather deceived of this reluctance concerning reform proposals (Inter-
view Gambina). 
Another activity of Argentina to alter the international financial regime was its effort 
to construct an alternative for the IMF. In December 2005 Argentina paid all its out-
standing IMF debt – 9.8 billion US-Dollars – back, in order to liberate itself from IMF 
interference into its economic policy.16 Argentina thereby followed Brazil that had some 
days before also paid back all its IMF debt of 15.5 billion US-Dollars. Parallel to this 
turning away from the IMF Argentina also took part at the foundation of an alternative 
to IMF and World Bank lending, the Bank of the South. The Banco del Sur is a com-
mon project of several Latin American states that try to develop an alternative to neolib-
eral multilateral lenders. The Bank of the South has been created on 9th of October 2007 
by Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.17 Contrary 
to World Bank and IMF where voting rights are bound to financial deposits, every 
member state of the Bank of the South has the same voting rights. The purpose of the 
Bank of the South is to give loans to developing states with respect to basic human and 
social rights and without neoliberal structural adjustment programs. Although the 
Bank’s starting capital of 7 billion US-Dollars is rather modest, the project is thought to 
make Argentina and other countries in the long run independent from World Bank and 
IMF loans.  
To conclude this case description we can ask if the Argentine debt repudiation fulfils 
the criteria of state civil disobedience. The debt moratorium from 2001 and even more 
the debt cut 2005 were definitely illegal, as many court rulings in several countries con-
firmed. The Argentine Presidents Saá and Kirchner justified the refusal also with uni-
versal moral reasons that stipulated the primacy of basic social rights over debt service 
(“no repayment at the cost of hunger”). And Argentina combined this conscience-based 
                                                 
15  Reuters News, 25.9.2003 
16  Freikauf vom IWF, telepolis, 20.12.2005 
17  Kampfansage an IWF und Weltbank, Deutsche Welle, 3.11.2007 
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policy with demands and concrete steps for an alternative international financial system. 
Finally, the Argentine debt repudiation was publicly announced and it didn’t resort to 
any extra-legal use of violence. The Argentine debt repudiation can therefore be classi-
fied as state civil disobedience.  
3.2. Bolivia’s violations of bilateral investment treaties 
The second case of state civil disobedience involves the conflict between citizen’s right 
to affordable access to drinking water and foreign investor’s rights to have their invest-
ment protected. During the 1990s World Bank and IMF had – as part of their Washing-
ton Consensus policy – put pressure on Bolivia that it should privatize its public water 
enterprises and end all subsidies to water supply. In September 1997 Bolivia and the 
World Bank “agreed” that Bolivia would privatize its public water enterprises in ex-
change to a World Bank loan of 138 Million Dollars. This form of “agreement” between 
poor and overindebted developing countries and multilateral lenders dominated by nor-
thern countries, is criticized by many southern countries and NGOs as blackmail. Due to 
its unsustainable amount of public debt (which is, as in the Argentina case, also a pro-
duct of the unfair sovereign debt regime), Bolivia did not have the financial autonomy 
to reject the World Bank conditionality. It therefore agreed to a damaging structural 
adjustment program that opened the water market for foreign investors but worsened 
citizen’s access to affordable drinking water. This form of blackmailing a developing 
country was experienced by many Bolivians as deeply unjust. 
In response to IMF/world bank pressure, Bolivia licensed private foreign enterprises 
to provide the water supply in the cities of Cochabamba and La Paz/El Alto. In Cocha-
bamba, an affiliate of the US-American multinational Bechtel, Aguas del Tunari, was 
licensed in September 1999. In La Paz/El Alto the company Aguas del Illimani, an affi-
liate of the French multinational Suez received the license in July 1997. The Internatio-
nal Finance Corporation, an arm the World Bank Group, was also minority shareholder 
of Aguas del Illimani. The contracts with the multinationals were very unfavourable to 
the local population (Crespo 2007; Solón/Rodríguez 2007). In Cochabamba the contract 
stipulated that Aguas del Tunari had to refinance all infrastructural investments with its 
water revenues in order to avoid public subsidies. Furthermore, the company received 
the right to realize an annual profit of 15-17% on its investment and water rates were 
bound to the US-Dollar, so that the exchange rate risk was shifted to consumers. These 
excessively investor-friendly provisions, which were comparable in La Paz/El Alto, led 
within short time to sharp water rate increases in both cities. In Cochabamba, water ra-
tes were raised drastically in December 1999 – although Bechtel admits only increases 
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of 35%, there is evidence of some citizens who suffered increases of up to 300%.18 In La 
Paz/El Alto, increases were not that drastic, but here as well prices rose sharply. 
The water rate increases triggered massive public protests first in Cochabamba, then 
in La Paz/El Alto. From January to April 2000 the city of Cochabamba saw a full-
fledged popular rebellion, also known as Guerra del Agua. It involved huge demonstra-
tions as well as street battles with the police that killed a 17 year old boy (Olivera 
2004). Although the government declared the state of siege, it was not able to calm 
down the protests. The water war in Cochabamba became famous worldwide, and it was 
supported by solidarity committees in Bolivia and around the world. And since the pro-
testers in the end achieved to terminate Aguas del Tunari’s license, the Guerra del Agua 
became one of the first victories and symbols of the transnational movement against 
neoliberal globalization (Assies 2003). The protest movement in Cochabamba formula-
ted its positions in human rights language and demanded international legal reform to 
protect the right to water:     
“2. Water is a fundamental human right and a public trust to be guarded by all 
levels of government; therefore, it should not be commodified, privatized, or 
traded for commercial purposes. These rights must be enshrined at all levels of 
government. In particular, an international treaty must ensure these principles 
are incontrovertible.” (The Cochabamba Declaration, December 8, 2000; 
documented in: Olivera 2004)  
On 10th of April 2000, the Bolivian government gave in and agreed to terminate the 
concession for Aguas del Tunari without paying a compensation to the company. This 
success in Cochabamba triggered protests in La Paz/El Alto, which lasted from 2000-
2005. These protests were influenced strongly by the Cochabamba experience, although 
they were less massive. However, in January 2005, the Bolivian government also termi-
nated the contract with Aguas del Illimani. 
The termination of the two contracts is the point where Bolivian state civil disobe-
dience began, because this move violated international investment law. International 
customary law protects foreign direct investment and obligates states to pay compensa-
tion in case that they expropriate possessions of foreign nationals. According to the so-
called Hull formula the compensation has to be “prompt, adequate and effective” and it 
also has to include expected future gains.  
However, since these customary law provisions are hard to enforce, many countries 
signed bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to protect foreign investment further. Appro-
ximately 2500 BITs have been signed mainly between developed countries on the one 
                                                 
18  The Democracy Centre in Cochabamba has put extensive evidence on it’s website that refutes the compa-
nies assurances (www.democracyctr.org).  
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side and underdeveloped countries on the other side. These are criticized because they 
grant excessive rights to investors which are not balanced with complementary respon-
sibilities, thereby reflecting the unequal negotiation power of the contracting countries 
(Anderson/Grusky 2007: 3-5). BITs often include restrictions on so called “indirect ex-
propriation” through e.g. environmental or social legislation that reduce the value of an 
investment. Furthermore, they often include bans on capital controls and limits on per-
formance requirements (that oblige foreign investors to e.g. use a certain percentage of 
local products). And the national treatment and most favoured nation treatment clauses 
make it difficult for developing countries to pursue national development strategies.  
Many BITs include also a clause that transfers jurisdiction in investment disputes to 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is part of 
the World Bank group. ICSID was founded on basis of an international convention, 
namely the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States. Under ICSID foreign investors can file complaints 
against host countries that are decided by dispute settlement panels with three members 
on the ground of BITs. The ICSID procedure is criticized as well for many reasons. 
Firstly, there are fundamental conflicts of interest: As in the Bolivia water disputes, the 
World Bank was itself involved in the privatization of water concessions, which became 
the topic of the dispute. And in the conflict concerning La Paz/El Alto, the World Bank 
was itself a conflicting party, since its International Finance Corporation was one of the 
share-holders of Aguas del Illimani. This is highly problematic, because – due to the 
procedural rules that guide arbitral panels – the World Bank President has the final 
competence to nominate the third arbitrator, when those nominated by complainant and 
defendant don’t find a consensus. The ICSID procedure is therefore no neutral dispute 
resolution procedure, since the World Bank is dominated by northern countries and in 
some cases even judge and complainant in the same conflict. NGOs demand for that 
reason the creation of an appeals procedure that is independent of the World Bank. A-
nother line of criticism concerns the fact, that only states can be judged to pay compen-
sation to investors in case they violated BITs. However, when a corporation evades ta-
xes or damages the environment in the host country, there is no compensation schedu-
led.  
To sum up, the international investment regime is in the eyes of many NGOs and de-
veloping countries deeply unjust, since it grants excessive rights to foreign investors 
without providing complementary responsibilities for them. The ICSID procedure is the 
place where unbalanced BITs are enforced and it thereby became the main target of 
Bolivia’s opposition. 
After leaving the city of Cochabamba without being compensated, Aguas del Tunari 
filed a lawsuit at ICSID where it complaint that Bolivia had violated the bilateral in-
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vestment treaty with the Netherlands. The parent company, Bechtel, had before founded 
a letter box company in the Netherlands which served formally as owner of Aguas del 
Tunari. This move made it possible to use the Bolivian-Dutch BIT for the lawsuit. Agu-
as del Tunari claimed a compensation of 25 million US-Dollars, although it had in-
vested far less money up to that time. The complaint triggered a world wide solidarity 
campaign with Bolivia. Pablo Solón, one of the movement’s spokespersons, calculated 
that Bechtel’s worldwide turnover of 14 billion US-Dollars was as big as Bolivia’s 
gross national product and that Bolivia could pay 3000 rural doctors with 25 million 
Dollars.19 A world wide NGO coalition tried in August 2002 to file an amicus curiae 
brief to the ICSID panel, where they argued that Bolivia’s measures were necessary to 
assure the right to affordable water supply.20 The panel should hold public hearings in 
Bolivia in order to recognize the citizen’s perspective. However, this request was decli-
ned in January 2003. Meanwhile the complaint had turned into a public relations di-
saster for Bechtel that was plagued with lots of protest activities at its branches in Euro-
pe and America. Although everybody expected Bechtel to win the compensation at 
ICSID, it eventually decided to drop the case. In July 2005 Bechtel therefore sold Aguas 
del Tunari to Bolivia at the symbolic price of 2 Bolivianos (=less than one US-Dollar). 
Bolivia as new owner immediately withdrew the ICSID complaint.21  
Also concerning the termination of the contract of Aguas del Illimani in La Paz/El 
Alto, the company threatened to file a ICSID complaint. In this case, the French parent 
company Suez argued that Bolivia had violated the Bolivian-French investment treaty. 
However, now Bolivia paid a compensation of 5.5 million US-Dollars and thereby a-
voided a formal complaint (Crespo, 2007: 141).  
The successful mobilisations against water privatisations in Bolivia triggered a varie-
ty of activities by the Bolivian state (and other actors) to reform international economic 
law, so that the human right to water is better protected. The ICSID proceedings in the 
Cochabamba case had alerted a huge number of international NGOs that became aware 
of the possibly devastating effects investor-to-state dispute settlement can have. But 
also in other countries like Argentina, Ecuador and Mexico governments and civil so-
ciety witnessed ICSID cases that caused widespread indignation (Anderson/Grusky 
2007: 10-20). The ICSID secretariat reacted to this criticism in October 2004 with a 
                                                 
19  http://www.voltairenet.org/article120357.html#article120357, 5.9.2002 
20  Petition of La Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y Vida, et al. to the Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/3, August 29, 2002. 
21  Rojas: Nuevo Gobierno debe disolver Aguas del Tunari, Los Tiempos.com, 10.1.2006 
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discussion paper that formulated several reform proposals for the procedure.22 In De-
cember 2006 the ICSID administrative council decided some minor reforms. The deci-
sion facilitated e.g. public hearings of concerned citizens that may now be held if no 
disputing party files a veto. However, the most important reform demands, to create an 
independent appeals mechanism and to consider human rights and social/ecologic law 
in dispute settlement were not realized.23  
In December 2005 Evo Morales, who had participated personally at the Cochabamba 
protests, was elected President of Bolivia and started bold activities to alter the interna-
tional investment regime. Morales presidency was an effect of the social protests against 
neoliberalism in Bolivia which had begun with the Cochabamba water dispute in 2000. 
Morales appointed one of the main spokes persons of the movement against water pri-
vatization, Pablo Solón, as special ambassador for commerce and integration. In April 
2007, the government announced together with Venezuela and Nicaragua that the count-
ries would quit the ICSID convention. On the fifth summit of the Bolivarian Alternative 
for the Americas (ALBA), they decided a resolution that condemns attempts by multi-
national companies to subvert social and environmental policies in developing countries 
with ICSID-complaints.24 However, while Venezuela and Nicaragua are at present still 
members of ICSID, Bolivia formally quit the convention on 2nd May 2007. This move 
was supported by 863 NGOs from 59 countries that demanded in a letter to World Bank 
president Zoellick the creation of an independent review panel for ICSID decisions, that 
accounts as well for social, economic and human rights.25 
But Bolivia did not only leave the criticized institution, it also started to construct al-
ternatives. Most importantly, Bolivia is currently renegotiating all its 24 bilateral in-
vestment treaties. The Bolivian government’s objective in these negotiations is to chan-
ge the aim of these treaties. Instead of promoting investment without further distinction, 
the new “development promotion treaties” shall attract only those investments which 
support the host country’s development (Interview Thomas Kruse). For this purpose, 
rights and responsibilities between host country and investor shall be rebalanced. Hu-
man rights as well as social and environmental regulation shall have at least equal stan-
ding with foreign investor’s rights. And as the ICSID dispute settlement procedure is 
                                                 
22  ICSID Secretariat 2004: Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discussion Pa-
per, October 22, 2004, www.worldbank.org/icsid 
23  Bretton Woods Project: „Watered-down“ changes to arbitration, update 50, http://brettonwoodsproject.org/ 
art.shtml?x=547592, 30.7.2007 
24  www.cadtm.org/imprimer.php3?id_article=2618, 31.7.2007, www.art-us.org/node/239, 27.6.2007 
25  „RE: Refusal to respect Bolivia’s withdrawal from investment dispute court“, January, 15, 2008, http://www.ips-
dc.org/reports/080115-boliviapetition-en.pdf 
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criticized as unbalanced, the new treaties don’t include the clause that constitutes ICSID 
jurisdiction in investment disputes.       
A further activity to reform international law and policies is Bolivia’s engagement as 
a founding member of the Banco del Sur, which shall in future serve as an alternative to 
World Bank loans and structural adjustment programs. To sum up, we can conclude that 
Bolivia is seriously trying to reform the international investment regime by withdrawing 
from ICSID, renegotiating bilateral investment treaties and creating together with other 
states the Bank of the South. 
Was Bolivia’s cancellation of water concessions a case of state civil disobedience? 
Firstly, the cancellation of water concessions in Cochabamba and La Paz/El Alto was 
supposedly illegal under bilateral investment treaties. The ICSID proceeding in the Co-
chabamba case was very likely to be won by the complaining multinational Bechtel, 
since Bolivia refused to pay compensation to Bechtel. Only due to massive public pres-
sure, Bechtel eventually gave in and sold his affiliate Aguas del Tunari to Bolivia, so 
that the proceeding ended without a ruling. Also in the La Paz/El Alto case, the cancel-
lation of the contract with Aguas del Illimani was supposedly illegal. However, in this 
case Bolivia eventually accepted to pay 5.5 million US-dollars compensation to Suez, 
which then renounced from complaining at ICSID.  
Secondly, concerning the conscientiousness of Bolivia’s breaches of law, the result is 
mixed. In both cases the governments of Hugo Banzer (2000 – Cochabamba contract) 
and Carlos Mesa (2005 – La Paz/El Alto contract) cancelled the contracts only due to 
massive pressure from below, and not by their own motivation. But at least we can say 
that the movements in Cochabamba and La Paz/El Alto justified their protest in terms of 
universal human rights claims. And the Bolivian government reacted with its decision to 
cancel the contract to these civil society claims. The conscientiousness of Bolivia’s 
breaches of law is therefore only indirect: While the governments themselves did not act 
conscientiously, the movements that in the end caused the termination of the contracts 
did so. However, in 2005 the government of Evo Morales assumed power, which is now 
defending the protester’s cause directly.  
Thirdly, we have to assess if Bolivia’s law violations were aiming at the improve-
ment of international law and policies. Also here the result is mixed, for the same rea-
sons as concerning the second criterion. While the protest movements in Cochabamba 
and La Paz/El Alto were clearly targeting international reforms, the Bolivian govern-
ments of Banzer and Mesa were suppressing these civil society claims. However, when 
Evo Morales assumed power, his government adopted the movement’s demands for 
international law reform and even appointed one of its spokespersons as special ambas-
sador for commerce. The decisions to withdraw from the ICSID convention, to renego-
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tiate all BITs and to found the Bank of South are clearly efforts that Bolivia is now 
transforming the initial breach of law into concrete reform projects. 
Fourthly and fifthly, the criteria of non-violence and publicity are met. When Bolivia 
terminated the contracts with Aguas del Tunari and Aguas del Illimani it only applied 
its legitimate monopoly of force and didn’t use any extra-legal violence. And the termi-
nation of the contract was not hidden in secret but announced publicly. In sum, we can 
therefore conclude, that Bolivia’s violations of investment treaties was a case of state 
civil disobedience.   
4. CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF STATE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
Why do states violate international law by means of state civil disobedience? And is this 
a successful way to bring about moral progress in international law and policies? In the 
following I give some preliminary answers to these causal questions, without pretending 
a deductive approach. Research on state civil disobedience is rather of an explorative 
nature, since we have little knowledge in this field. Therefore, an inductive approach, 
which condenses possible explanations out of the empirical material, seems to be more 
appropriate. 
Concerning the explanation of state civil disobedience, we can observe a similar pat-
tern in both cases of this study. The governments of Argentina and Bolivia were both 
under heavy pressure of transnational social movements. These movements combined 
local protests directed at national governments as well as transnational activities criticiz-
ing the unjust international regime directly. In the Argentine case massive protests in 
the country demanded priority for basic social rights and disrespect to debt service and 
IMF structural adjustment. These protests were supported by NGOs in the whole world 
(e.g. the Jubilee Network), which since long call for a fair state insolvency procedure 
and the odious debt doctrine. And in the Bolivia case there were strong local protest 
movements in the cities of Cochabamba and La Paz/El Alto that criticized water price 
increases. These movements were supported by international NGOs that criticize World 
Bank privatisation policy, exaggerated investor rights and claim the human right to have 
access to water. In both cases there is a clear causal link observable: neither Argentina’s 
debt repudiation nor Bolivia’s cancellation of water licences would have occurred with-
out the combined pressure from local protesters backed by strong international NGOs.     
An essential element seems to be the combination of local and international activism. 
The local population in a state, that implements specific international rules, experiences 
most directly the injustice of these rules. This local activism of ordinary people is trig-
gered by a sentiment of injustice, but it often hasn’t got any idea of the international 
dimensions of the case:  
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“The number of people in Bolivia who have come to an intellectual or ideologi-
cal opposition to ICSID dispute settlement is very limited. […] On the other 
hand, the average person in Cochabamba just got that Bechtel was coming here 
and ripping them of […]. And when Bechtel sued Bolivia for 25 million dollars, 
people thought: no way, that’s unfair.” (Interview Jim Shultz, Democracy Cen-
tre Cochabamba, 14.12.2007)   
However, local activism in Bolivia (as well as in Argentina) was supported by special-
ized national and international NGOs, that translated the local claims (“stop water prices 
increases”) into the language of the discourse on international justice (“no exaggerated 
investor rights that violate the human right to water access”). There is a division of la-
bour observable, in which local activism exerts pressure on the national government, 
while specialized national and international NGOs justify the cause on the global level 
and formulate reform propositions for international law from these local conflicts. 
The cases of Argentina and Bolivia demonstrate that state civil disobedience is es-
sentially caused by transnational civil society mobilisation. Both states, that violated 
international law, were reacting to a moral impetus originating from ordinary citizens 
that defended themselves against unjust international law. State civil disobedience could 
in such cases also be called “civil society based disobedience”.26 Civil society has for 
that reason as well a partial obligation to present valid moral reasons for law violations 
it has pressured for. However, although civil society can bear parts of the moral respon-
sibility, it is only the state that has the legal responsibility for any international law vio-
lation, so that the concept of state civil disobedience is still adequate.   
Even more important than the question, why state civil disobedience occurs, is an in-
vestigation of the effects of this reform path. Is it possible to bring about moral progress 
in international law and policies that are criticised as deeply unjust?  
To begin with, we have to acknowledge that progress in international law and poli-
cies is probably in almost all cases caused by a large bundle of causes and evolves over 
long time periods. It would be surprising to observe that since long time established 
international law is changed quickly because of the opposition of one country. We 
should therefore not have exaggerated expectations in this respect. But we know on the 
other hand that civil disobedience in national societies often functions as a catalyst that 
dramatizes conflicts and thereby triggers lots of further, mostly legal activities that in 
sum bring about change.  
One of the most evident consequences of the Argentine and Bolivian state civil dis-
obedience is the foundation of the Bank of the South together with other states. Surely 
the Bank was not founded only due to Argentina’s debt repudiation and Bolivia’s 
                                                 
26  I owe this expression to Dieter Senghaas’ comments. 
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breach of investment rules. But both were important watershed events that caused Ar-
gentina’s and Bolivia’s turning away from IMF/World Bank economic policies and 
triggered the search for alternative models. Understood in this way we can conclude that 
state civil disobedience in these examples contributed to the creation of a new interna-
tional organization that hopefully will better reflect moral demands.  
While the Bank of the South is the only tangible effect of the Argentine debt repudia-
tion, the Bolivian water dispute triggered some more effects. The ICSID dispute settle-
ment procedure is currently in a legitimacy crisis (Franck 2005), which was caused by 
contentious proceedings and deepened by Bolivia’s withdrawal from the procedure. The 
amendment of ICSID’s procedural rules for dispute settlement was a first reaction that 
reflects civil society criticism. And secondly we observe Bolivia’s efforts to renegotiate 
its bilateral investment treaties. 
Comparing Argentina and Bolivia it seems that Argentina is far less successful to al-
ter the sovereign credit regime than Bolivia with respect to the investment regime. A 
plausible explanation to this finding could be the different degree of institutionalization 
of the two regimes. The international investment regime features clear contractual pri-
mary norms (bilateral investment treaties) and secondary norms (ICSID dispute settle-
ment procedure). Contrary to that there are no international treaties concerning sover-
eign credits, which are regulated mainly by customary law provisions (primary norms). 
And there is furthermore no dispute settlement procedure (secondary norms) to cope 
with sovereign defaults. The higher degree of institutionalization of the investment re-
gime simply creates more opportunities to alter the regime by renegotiation of invest-
ment treaties or amendment of procedural rules for dispute settlement. It is by contrast 
far more difficult to alter the sovereign debt regime where there are no treaties or dis-
pute settlement procedures to be altered directly. 
5. CONCLUSION   
This paper argued that the concept of individual civil disobedience which is widely ac-
cepted in political philosophy has to be applied to violations of international law by 
state actors. While the progress of international law promises to create more interna-
tional justice, some international law provisions institutionalize fundamentally unjust 
rules. In order to prevent international institutions from developing towards a global 
Leviathan, we need a basic right for states to disobey unjust international rules. Criteria 
derived from individual disobedience can be applied with some minor adjustments to 
state civil disobedience.  
Although the idea of state civil disobedience is already accepted by some authors, the 
concept has until now not yet been applied in detail to specific empirical cases. My pa-
per fills this gap with an extensive analysis of Argentina’s debt repudiation and Bo-
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livia’s breaches of bilateral investment treaties. Both cases confirm the importance of a 
theory of state civil disobedience. Although both states broke international law it would 
be completely misleading to describe these cases as mere law breaking, which is mor-
ally unacceptable. To the contrary, both countries have to be praised and supported for 
their courage to challenge unjust economic rules on the basis of human rights argu-
ments. However, the cases also demonstrated that the impetus to breach the law origi-
nates rather from civil society protest that from the government. In Argentina as well as 
in Bolivia massive protests demanding basic social rights in the end compelled the gov-
ernments to breach the law. In fact the only way for a grass roots movement to chal-
lenge unjust international rules is to pressure the government to challenge these rules. 
That civil society protest is at the beginning of state civil disobedience demonstrates that 
the concept fits to reality.  
To consider international breaches of law as civil disobedience can help us to ad-
vance international law in moral respects. Civil disobedience has in national societies 
served as an early warning system for moral deficits and as a factory for reform alterna-
tives. State civil disobedience can fulfil the same task for international politics and is for 
this reason indispensable. In order to become a tool for the moral progress of interna-
tional law, the concept of state civil disobedience has to be applied by political scien-
tists, politicians and activists in public discourse. As the concept of civil disobedience 
cannot be introduced by international institutions or treaties into international relations 
(the law cannot allow its own violation), the only way is to introduce the concept by 
public discourse “from below”. As my case studies demonstrate, there are a number of 
law violations that fit civil disobedience criteria, but they are not (yet) labelled as civil 
disobedience in public discourse. The use of civil disobedience terminology could 
probably shift the discourse on this kind of law violations, so that the progressive poten-
tial of civil disobedience can be lifted for international relations.    
REFERENCE 
Abbott, Kenneth/Snidal, Duncan 2000: Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in: International 
Organization 54: 3, 421-456. 
Ali, Tariq/Amin, Samir/Walden, Bello/u.a. 2005: Alternativen zur Tyrannei der neoliberalen Globalisie-
rung. Manifest von Porto Alegre vom 29. Januar 2005, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Po-
litik 3: 2005, 382-384. 
Anderson, Sarah/Grusky, Sara 2007: Challenging Corporate Investor Rule, How the World Bank's In-
vestment Court, Free Trade Agreements, and Bilateral Investment Treaties have Unleashed a New 
Era of Corporate Power and What to Do About it, Washington, D.C. 
Arendt, Hannah 1972: Civil Disobedience, in: Arendt, Hannah (Hrsg.): Crises of the Republic, New York, 
50-102. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 86) 
- 26 - 
Barry, Christian/Tomitova, Lydia 2006: Fairness in Sovereign Debt, in: Social Research 73: 2. 
Bedau, Hugo Adam 1961: On Civil Disobedience, in: The Journal of Philosophy 58: 21, 653-661. 
Bedau, Hugo Adam 1991: Civil Disobedience in Focus, London. 
Brownlee, Kimberly 2007: Civil Disobedience, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/, First published Thu 4 Jan, 2007. 
Buchanan, Allen 2001: From Nuremburg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform, 
in: Ethics 111: 4 (Jul., 2001), 673-705. 
Buchanan, Allen 2004: Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundations for International 
Law, New York. 
Cafiero, Mario 2004: Proposal for a Balanced Long-Term Solution to Argentina's Public Debt Problem, 
Buenos Aires, http://www.jubileeresearch.org/news/argentina290904_1.htm. 
Christian Aid 2007: Enough is enough: The debt repudiation option, http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/. 
Crespo, Carlos 2007: Agua, soberanía nacional y resistencia social. Los convenios bilaterales sobre pro-
moción y protección a la inversiones: los casos de Holanda y Francia, in: Crespo, Carlos/Spronk, Su-
san (Hrsg.): Después de las guerras del agua, La Paz, 109-146. 
Damill, Mario/Frenkel, Roberto/Rapetti, Martin 2005: La deuda argentina: Historía, default y reestruc-
turación, in: Desarollo Económico 45: 178 (julio-septiembre 2005), 187-233. 
Dworkin, Ronald 1977: Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Franck, Susan D. 2005: The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: Privatizing public interna-
tional law through inconsistent decisions, in: Fordham Law Review 73, 1521-1625. 
Goodin, Robert E. 2005: Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International Law-
Breakers From Would-Be Law-Makers, in: Journal of Ethics 9, 225-246. 
Greenawalt, Kent 1987: Conflicts of Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen 1983: Ziviler Ungehorsam - Testfall für den demokratischen Rechtsstaat. Wider den 
autoritären Legalismus in der Bundesrepublik, in: Glotz, Peter (Hrsg.): Ziviler Ungehorsam im 
Rechtsstaat, Frankfurt/Main, 29-53. 
Höffe, Otfried 1999: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, München. 
Khalfan, Ashfaq/King, Jeff/Thomas, Bryan 2003: Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine, Montreal. 
Kokaz, Nancy 2005: Theorizing International Fairness, in: Metaphilosophy 36: 1/2, January 2005, 68-92. 
Morgan-Foster, Jason 2003: The Relationship of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs to Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited, in: Michigan Journal of International Law 
24, 577-646. 
Olivera, Oscar 2004: Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Olmos Gaona, Alejandro 2005: La deuda odiosa. El valor de una doctrina jurídica como instrumento de 
solución política, Buenos Aires. 
Olmos, Alejandro 2006: Todo lo que usted quiso saber sobre la deuda externa y siempre se lo ocultaron. 
Quienes y como la contrajeron, Buenos Aires. 
Pogge, Thomas 1989: Realizing Rawls, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 86) 
- 27 - 
Pogge, Thomas 2005: World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge. 
Rawls, John 1979: Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, Frankfurt a.M. 
Raz, Joseph 1979: The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Romano, Cesare P. R. 1999: The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 
in: NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 31, 709-51. 
Schill, Stephan 2007: Auf zu Kalypso? Staatsnotstand und Internationales Investitionsschutzrecht – An-
merkung zur ICSID-Entscheidung LG&E Energy Corp. vs. Argentina, in: SchiedsVZ, 4, 178-186. 
Solón, Pablo/Rodríguez, Denisse 2007: El agua en los países Andinos y los Acuerdos de Libre Comercio, 
La Paz. 
UNDP 1999: Human Development Report 1999, New York. 
Zangl, Bernhard 2006: Die Internationalisierung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Streitbeilegung in GATT und 
WTO, Frankfurt/Main. 
Zangl, Bernhard/Zürn, Michael 2004: Make Law, Not War: Internationale Verrechtlichung als Baustein 
für Global Governance, in: Zangl, Bernhard/Zürn, Michael (Hrsg.): Verrechtlichung - Baustein für 
Global Governance?, Bonn. 
Ziegler, Jean 2005: Das Imperium der Schande: der Kampf gegen Armut und Unterdrückung, München. 
Interviews: 
Mario Cafiero, Former Deputy of the Argentine Congress, Foreign Debt Activist, Buenos Ai-
res/Argentina, 6.12.2007. 
Thomas Kruse, Assistant to the Special Ambassador for Commerce and Integration, La Paz/Bolivia, 
21.12.2007. 
Julio Gambina, Spokesperson of Attac Argentina, Buenos Aires/Argentina, 27.11.2007. 
Alejandro Olmos Gaona, Instituto Universitario Isedet, Expert concerning Argentinas Foreign Debt, Bue-
nos Aires/Argentina, 22.11.2007. 
Jim Shultz, Director of the Democracy Centre, Cochabamba/Bolivia, 18.12.2007. 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Gerald Neubauer is research fellow at the Collaborative Research Center “Transforma-
tions of the State”, University of Bremen. 
Telephone:  +49 421 218 8703 
Fax:  +49 421 218-8721 
E-Mail: gerald.neubauer@sfb597.uni-bremen.de 
Address: University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center „Transfor-
mations of the State“, Linzer Strasse 9a, D 28359 Bremen 
